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JUSTICE, ACCESS TO THE COURTS, AND THE RIGHT TO
FREE COUNSEL FOR INDIGENT PARENTS: THE
CONTINUING SCOURGE OF LASSITER V. DEPARTMENT
OF SOCIAL SERVICES OF DURHAM

by BRUCE A. BOYER*

INTRODUCTION

Nearly a century ago, legal services pioneer Reginald Heber Smith observed
that "substantive law, however fair and equitable itself, is impotent to provide the
necessary safeguards unless the administration of justice, which alone gives effect
and force to substantive law, is in the highest sense impartial."' The expression of
this lofty ideal introduced Smith's sweeping indictment of the manner in which

indigents seeking to enforce basic civil rights in the early twentieth century were
routinely denied meaningful recourse to the courts:
The administration of American justice is not impartial; the rich
and the poor do not stand equally before the law; the traditional
method of providing justice has operated to close the doors of the
courts to the poor, and has caused a gross denial of justice in all
2
parts of the country to millions of persons.
Almost ninety years after Smith issued his indictment, gaps in the ability of
our civil courts to achieve the ideal of fair and equitable administration of justice
are more profound than ever.' Plainly, no meaningful discourse on the subject of
* Clinical Professor and Director, Loyola University Chicago School of Law ChildLaw Clinic,
This article was originally published in the Loyola Law Journal at 36 LOYOLA U. CHICAGO L.J. 363
(2005).
1. REGINALD HEBER SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR 5 (Patterson Smith Publishing Co. 1972)
(1919). Smith's work has been widely cited and generally recognized as a landmark of the legal aid
movement. See also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Access to Justice: The Social Responsibility of Lawyers: In
Pursuit of the Public Good: Access to Justice in the United States, 7 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 1, 5-6
(2001) (noting that Smith's "groundbreaking" treatise "galvanized a national movement to provide
lawyers for those who could not afford to pay counsel fees").
2. SMITH, supra note 1, at 8.

3. Douglas J.Besharov, Terminating ParentalRights: The Indigent Parent'sRight to Counsel After
Lassiter v. North Carolina, 15 FAm. L.Q. 205, 219, 221 (1981) (examining the issues surrounding an
indigent parent's right to counsel in a termination of parental rights proceeding following Lassiter v.
Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981)). Professor Deborah Rhode writes similarly of
Lassiter: "It is a cruel irony that, in domestic violence cases, defendants who face little risk of
[6351
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"justice" can fully ignore important questions about who is entitled to access the
courts to vindicate important rights, and how rights of access are distributed among
litigants with and without means. Access to justice in the civil arena encompasses
a broad spectrum of issues and concerns, though arguably none more compelling
than the regulation of relationships between children and their parents - long
recognized as "fundamental" and consequently entitled to the constitutional
protections afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment.4 It is the purpose of this essay
to explore obstacles facing indigent parents confronted with challenges to their
relationships with their children, and to urge reconsideration of the 1981 decision
of the Supreme Court5 that underpins the jurisprudence limiting indigents' access to
counsel in matters involving fundamental civil rights.
I. THE LEGACY

OF LASSITER:

FRASE V.

BARNHART

In broad theory, all recognized family relationships are of course entitled to
the same presumptive protections of the Constitution, regardless of the relative
depth of the involved family members' resources. In practice, however, there is
little question that access to counsel continues to be a critical factor in determining
the extent to which parents and children are able to successfully safeguard
fundamental rights. This point is powerfully illustrated by the plight of a woman
named Deborah Frase, whose recent battle to preserve her right to parent her threeyear-old son was documented in Frase v. Barnhart6 in the Maryland Appellate
Court. During an eight-week period of incarceration for charges related to her
possession of marijuana, Ms. Frase made informal arrangements through her
mother for an unrelated couple - Mr. and Mrs. Barnhart - to care for her son
Brett. 7 Following her release, Ms. Frase recovered custody of her son, but several
days later the Barnharts filed an action to regain custody of the child. 8
Because she was unable to afford a private attorney or secure counsel through
any of the overwhelmed legal services agencies offering legal representation to
indigent clients, Ms. Frase was forced to represent herself in the proceedings that
followed. 9 Prior to the hearing, she conducted no discovery or preparation of her
defense. During the hearing itself, she failed to prevent the admission of irrelevant
and prejudicial hearsay evidence, challenge the characterization of the competing
litigants as "good Samaritans" who had formed an important bond with her son
during the six weeks he had been in their care, or present any applicable law or
legal argument as to the limits of the assigned domestic relations master's authority

significant sanctions are entitled to counsel, while victims whose lives are at risk are expected to seek

legal protection without legal assistance." Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REv.

1785, 1799 (2001).
4. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-66 (2000) (citing a long list of Supreme Court
cases acknowledging parents' fundamental and constitutionally protected liberty interests in the
companionship, care, custody, and management of their children).
5. Lassiter,452 U.S. 18.
6. 840 A.2d 114 (Md. 2003).
7. Id.at 116.
8. Id.
9. Id.at 116-17.
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to interfere with the custodial rights and responsibilities of a fit parent.' 0 Perhaps
even more damaging was Ms. Frase's failure to discover or raise in a timely fashion
a claim of conflict of interest based on a past attorney-client relationship between
the master and Ms. Frase's mother. In the previous case, Ms. Frase had been sued
by her mother for custody of an older child, based on nearly identical allegations
that Ms. Frase was not a responsible parent.' In Frase, Ms. Frase's mother not
only orchestrated the placement of the child, but also testified as a witness on
behalf of the Barnharts, 2 leaving the master's alignment with one of the parties
unmistakably clear and giving rise to a conflict of interest that ought to have been
readily apparent to any young lawyer. 3
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that Ms. Frase's case was "badly
compromised" by her proceeding pro se.'4 At the conclusion of the proceedings in
the trial court, though Ms. Frase was found to be fit and was allowed to recover
custody of her child, her rights as a custodial parent were seriously circumscribed. 15
Not only was her custody of her child made contingent upon her willingness to
reside in a "family support center," but she was also obliged to permit visitation
16
between her son and the Barnharts, at a location of the court's choosing.
Moreover, without any of the requisite findings that would have warranted
initiating a child protection action, 7 the trial court made Ms. Frase subject to the
18
continuing supervision of both the court and the Department of Social Services.
In the wake of the United States Supreme Court decision in Troxel v. Granville,19
all of these conditions were plainly unconstitutional. 20 Only with the able
assistance of volunteer appellate counsel was Ms. Frase ultimately able to have the
full panoply of her custodial rights restored.2'

10. Brief for Appellant at 29-32, Frase,840 A.2d 114 (No. 6) (brief on file with author) [hereinafter
"Clinic Brief'].
11. Id. at 14-15.
12. Id. at 15.
13. Maryland's Code of Conduct for Judicial Appointees prohibits participation in a "proceeding in
which the judicial appointee's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including an instance when:
(a) the judicial appointee has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party's lawyer, or
extra-official knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding; [or] (b)(i) the judicial
appointee served as lawyer in the matter in controversy." Md. Rules, Rule 16-814, CCJA Canon
3(D)(l)(a)-(b) (West 2004).
14. Clinic Brief at 29, Frase,849 A.2d 114. In its amicus brief to the United States Supreme Court,
the American Bar Association observed that individuals facing the termination of their parental rights
are frequently even less equipped to represent themselves than most pro se litigants because they often

lack more than a minimal education. Brief of Amicus Curiae American Bar Association at 9-10,
Lassiter, 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (No. 79-6423).
15. Frase, 840 A.2d at 117.
16. Id.
17. For example, courts may require, in limited circumstances, for the periodic review of custody
situations for children identified as "children in need of assistance (CINA)." Id. at 126.
18. Id.

19. 530 U.S. 57, 75 (2000) (limiting the power of the courts to impose conditions on a fit parent's
exercise of her custodial rights).
20. Frase, 840 A.2d at 117. The court in Frase relied on Troxel in striking down the master's
interference with Ms. Frase's custodial rights as a fit parent. Id. at 128-29.
21. Id. at 125-29.
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Ms. Frase's plight is highly reminiscent of that of Abby Gail Lassiter, whose
pro se efforts to defend herself in an action to terminate her parental rights led, in
1981, to a narrow 5-4 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court. 2 In its holding, the
Court declined to acknowledge a broad, constitutionally-based right to counsel for
indigents in proceedings to terminate parental rights. 23 Justice Blackmun's
dissenting opinion in Lassiter documents examples of Ms. Lassiter's utter inability
to comprehend the legal proceedings, including her failures to discern the purpose
of cross-examination, object to inadmissible testimony, or argue on her own
behalf. 4 Despite the obvious prejudice to Ms. Lassiter arising from her lack of
representation, the Court refused to extend the same type of comprehensive
requirement of counsel for indigents provided to criminal defendants under Gideon
v. Wainwright.25 Instead, while it recognized the fundamental, constitutionallyprotected liberty interests at stake in a termination action, the Court nevertheless
concluded that states should be free to conduct an individualized balancing of
26
factors in each case, under the three-part test described in Mathews v. Eldridge.
II. TIHE POST-L4SSITER LANDSCAPE: CURRENT PRACTICES GOVERNING
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL FOR INDIGENT CIVIL LITIGANTS

Since 1981, the Court's opinion in Lassiter has served as a touchstone for
every judicial consideration of the rights of access to the courts for poor people in
civil cases. With the door left open to experimentation by the states, indigent civil
litigants in the family law arena face a wide array of responses to requests for
appointed counsel, as well as related obstacles to court access. In child protection
cases involving state-initiated actions to terminate parental rights, the right of an
indigent parent to appointed counsel continues to be widely recognized. At the
time of the decision in Lassiter, all but seventeen states had recognized such rights,
either as a matter of constitutional law2 7 or statute. 28 Indeed, since 1979, only one

22. Lassiter,452 U.S. 18 (198 1).
23. Id. at 33-34. In this case, the indigent and incarcerated mother was without counsel at a hearing
to terminate her parental rights. Id. at 21. However, because the mother did not assert at the hearing
that she was indigent and required court-appointed counsel and because the trial court found that the
mother failed to take any steps to obtain counsel prior to the hearing, the court allowed the hearing to
proceed without counsel for the mother. Id. at 21-22. On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court sustained this
decision under the Fourteenth Amendment because, in the Court's view, the trial court properly balanced
the various interests involved in this civil case. Id. at 33-34.
24, Id. at 53-56 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
25. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). In Lassiter, the Court recognized that an "indigent's right to appointed
counsel is that such a right has been recognized to exist only where the litigant may lose his physical
liberty." Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 25. However, the LassiterCourt then distinguished Gideon from the case
at issue by finding that "as a litigant's interest in personal liberty diminishes, so does his right to
appointed counsel." Id. at 26.
26, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The Court in Lassiter identified three balancing factors established by
Mathews: first, the parent's interest must be extremely important; next, there is a high risk of error
without parental counsel; and finally, the state's interest is low. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31.
27. See, e.g., State ex rel. Heller v. Miller, 399 N.E.2d 66, 70 (Ohio 1980) ("In the absence of
sufficient justification by the state, [indigent] parents must be provided with a transcript and appointed
counsel or they will be unconstitutionally deprived of their right of appeal."); Crist v. Div. of Youth &
Family Servs., 320 A.2d 203, 211 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1974) (discussing how substantial loss of
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state has curtailed rights to counsel available prior to Lassiter,29 and seven states
that had previously limited appointments now provide statutorily for the mandatory
appointment of counsel in termination cases, either automatically or on request of a
financially eligible parent.10 As a consequence, despite the limitations of the
Fourteenth Amendment described in Lassiter, most indigent parents continue to be
entitled to free counsel when they are forced to respond to charges of parental
unfitness brought by the state. 3
However, in situations other than state-initiated actions to terminate parental
rights, the entitlement to counsel is far less certain, even when the potential
consequences of the action are every bit as dire. Most significantly, when a suit to
terminate parental rights is brought by a private individual rather than by the state,

privileges, including loss of child, should not occur without having the opportunity to have counsel
assigned without cost); State ex rel. Lemaster v. Oakley, 203 S.E.2d 140, 145 (W. Va. 1974) (holding
when parents face possible termination of parental rights, due process requires court-appointed counsel
for parents); In re Ella R.B., 285 N.E.2d 288, 290 (N.Y. 1972) (stating indigent person faced with loss of
child and possible criminal charges is entitled to assistance of counsel).
28. See Rosalie R. Young, The Right to Appointed Counsel in Termination of Parental Rights
Proceedings:the States' Response to Lassiter, 14 TOURO L. REv. 247, 262, 278 tbl.3 (1997) (listing and
describing the statutory grant of parental counsel in several states).
29. Id. at 262 (noting that although a Mississippi statute granted parental counsel at the time the
complaint in Lassiterwas filed, that statute was repealed in 1979, before the Court reached a decision in
the case). A 1997 study of counsel for parents in termination cases concluded that indigent parents are
rarely afforded counsel in that state. Id. at 263 n.80 (stating that in Mississippi parents must find
counsel or represent themselves as counsel rarely appointed).
30. Some of the states which recognized the right of an indigent parent to counsel include: Florida,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.807(l)(a) (West 2003) and FLA. R. Juv. PRoc. R. 8.515(a)(2) (2003); North
Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1101 (2003); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1570 (2004);
Texas, TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 107.013(a)(1), (2) (2004); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5519(c)
(2003); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-266(C) (2004); and West Virginia, W. VA. CODE ANN. 49-62(a) (West 2004). For additional information about state-specific statutes and practices, see Patricia C.
Kussmann, Annotation, Right of Indigent Parent to Appointed Counsel in Proceedingfor Involuntary
Termination of ParentalRights, in 92 A.L.R. 5th 379 (2001).
31. See, e.g., In re J.C., 108 S.W.3d 914, 916 (Tex. App. 2003) (describing how the appointment of
an attorney for indigent parents contesting the termination of their parental rights is mandatory); J.A.H.
v. Calhoun County Dep't of Human Res., 846 So. 2d 1093, 1095 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002) (stating that
failure to appoint counsel for indigent father was improper); In re Jeisean M., 812 A.2d 80, 84 (Conn.
App. Ct, 2002) (holding indigent parent in termination of parental rights case statutorily entitled to
counsel); In re Adoption of Olivia, 761 N.E.2d 536, 541 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002) (stating that "an indigent
parent is entitled to court-appointed counsel in proceedings that terminate parental rights"); Little v.
Little, 487 S.E.2d 823, 824-25 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997) (explaining that if parent is present and does not
waive counsel, appointment is mandatory); Wofford v. Eid, 671 So. 2d 859, 863 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1996) (failing to advise parent of right to counsel required reversal of termination order); In re R.R., 587
N.E.2d 1341, 1343 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that failure to appoint counsel for disabled mother in
dependency hearings leading to termination action required reversal of order terminating parental
rights); In re S.R.H., 809 P.2d 1, 3 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that constitutional rights of due process
not contingent on an indigent parent making request for an attorney); In re M.E.M., 635 P.2d 1313, 1317
(Mont. 1981) (appointing counsel is mandatory for indigent Native American parent facing termination
action under Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1912(b) (2000)); In re Keifer, 406 N.W.2d 217, 219
(Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (noting that failure to appoint counsel for indigent father at outset of proceedings
leading to termination of parental rights was reversible error); State ex rel. Dep't of Human Serv. v.
Perlman, 635 P.2d 588, 589-91 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981) (failing to explain right to counsel to indigent
mother in parental rights termination proceeding violates due process).
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indigent parents commonly have no guarantee of free counsel. 32 Not uncommonly,
in private custody and adoption disputes, parties frequently trade allegations of
child abuse or neglect that are integral to a charge of unfitness against the parent or
parents whose rights are threatened. As a consequence, in cases where the
involvement of child protection services is significant, an indigent client may be
able to establish the necessary element of state action, and thus at least argue for the
application of Lassiter's balancing test. For example, in In re Adoption of K.L.P., a
mother whose fitness was challenged in an adoption proceeding sought and was
denied appointed counsel by the trial court.3 3 The trial court then found the mother
unfit and granted the request for termination of parental rights. 34 On the mother's
appeal, the court first appointed her appellate counsel, and then remanded to the
trial court after finding that the failure to grant her free trial counsel was a violation
of her constitutional rights. 35 On review of the County's objection to the order
requiring it to pay appellate counsel, the Illinois Supreme Court subsequently
agreed to apply the constitutional test of Lassiter,finding the necessary element of
state action in the history of prior juvenile court proceedings involving the same
minors.3 6 Moreover, the court held that the mother was entitled to free legal
counsel, both with respect to the appeal, and on remand in the trial court. 7
To be sure, the end result in K.L.P. was positive, from the perspective of
indigent parents seeking assistance in the protection of fundamental rights.
However, as long as Lassiter continues to be the law of the land, K.L.P.'s
application will be limited. The court in K.L.P. considered and rejected an
argument by the mother that the use of the judicial system to terminate parental
rights is, by definition, state action, no matter who initiates the petition.3" The
decision that the mother was entitled to free counsel instead was based on the
specific procedural history of the case, a history which the court itself noted was
particularly unusual.39 While the presence of child protection investigators in
family disputes that land in adoption court may occur with some frequency, it is
much less common for a private adoption to be predicated on a prior proceeding in

32. See, e.g., Rosewell v. Hanrahan, 523 N.E.2d 10, 12 (111.App. Ct. 1988) (responding parent not
entitled to free counsel in termination action brought by private individuals); Baird v. Harris, 778
S.W.2d 147, 148 (Tex. App. 1989) (finding that a statute providing for indigent counsel for parents in
termination actions brought by a governmental agency did not clearly extend to private termination
proceedings).
33, In re Adoption of K.L.P., 735 N.E.2d 1071 (11. App. Ct. 2002).
34. Id. at 1074.
35. Id. at 1080-82.
36. In re Adoption of K.L.P., 763 N.E.2d 741, 749-53 (1L1,
2002).
37. Id. at 755.
38. Id. at 750-51. This argument was based primarily on the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in
Shelley v. Kraemer, in which the Court held that use of the state's judicial process to enforce a racially
restrictive covenant was state action violating the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19 (1948). One Florida Appellate court recently took a different view,
extending the right to counsel to parents facing privately-initiated termination actions. M.E.K. v.
R.L.K., 921 So.2d 787 (Fla. App. 2006). The Florida court's holding rested on its view that the state's
involvement in such actions is not meaningfully distinguishable from its role in state-initiated
termination hearings. The decision in M.E.K. circumvented Lassiter by resting its holding on the
Florida Constitution, rather than on the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 790.
39. K.LP., 763 N.E.2d. at 746.
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the juvenile court, taking K.L.P. out of the norm of private infant or step-parent
adoptions.
Even assuming that the logic of K.L.P. would be found persuasive in other
states, individuals facing the possible termination of their parental rights may
confront a broad range of other barriers to access to the courts left untouched by the
constitutional parameters of Lassiter, K.L.P., and Lassiter's other progeny. These
barriers come in many forms, both direct and indirect. Even when an indigent's
right to counsel is recognized, many people clearly lacking the means to hire an
attorney may not be able to satisfy applicable standards of indigence that vary
widely in their degrees of strictness. 4 The constitutional guarantee of a right to
counsel is of little comfort to an individual who is too poor to hire an attorney, but
41
insufficiently impoverished to qualify as a pauper.
Poor people facing the termination of parental rights may be effectively
prevented from meaningful access to justice not only by the deprivation of counsel,
but also by the imposition of litigation access fees,4 2 necessary ongoing litigation
expenses, 43 the requirement of advance security or payment for litigation
expenses,"4 and the taxation of CoStS. 4 5 Each of these categories of barriers, though

40. See Young, supra note 28, at 263 n.81 (discussing the various "indigence" standards used in
different states and listing several statutory examples).
41. Federal law prohibits individuals earning more than 125% of poverty guidelines from receiving
federally funded free legal services. 45 C.F.R. § 1611.3(b) (2005). Current poverty limits for the fortyeight contiguous states and the District of Columbia are $9310 annually for an individual, and $18,850
annually for a family of four. Annual Update of the Health & Human Services Poverty Guidelines, 69
FED. REG. 7335 (Feb. 13, 2004).
42. E.g., Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect
One's Rights -Part 1, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1158-60 (1973) (comparing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 371 (1971) (striking down divorce filing fee as violative of due process) with United States v. Kras,
409 U.S. 434 (1973) (upholding filing fee charged to indigent petitioner seeking bankruptcy) with
Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (refusing to overturn appellate court filing fee imposed on
welfare recipients challenging benefit cuts)). Professor Michelman criticizes the Court's emphasis on
the nature of the interest at stake as a basis for determining when indigents are constitutionally entitled
to the waiver of litigation access fees. Id. at 1162.
43. Professor Michelman uses the term "equipage" to describe the ongoing necessary expenses
associated with the effective presentation of a case, including costs and fees for consultants, expert
witnesses, investigators, stenographers, and printing. Michelman, supra, note 42, at 1163; see also
SMITH, supra note 1, at 20-30 (exploring history of trial costs, present costs and costs at the appeals
stage and how these costs negatively impact the judicial process); David Medine, The Constitutional
Right to Expert Assistance for Indigents in Civil Cases, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 281, 285-89 (1990)
(discussing how extra expense of expert testimony can adversely effect indigent litigants); William B.
Rubenstein, The Concept of Equality in Civil Procedure, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1865, 1873-84 (2002)
(exploring the concept of "equipage equality" and adverse impact on the merit and validity of judicial
outcomes when litigants bring unequal resources to the table).
44. See Selletti v. Carey, 173 F.3d 104, 112 (2d Cir. 1999) (discussing whether plaintiffs inability to
post security warrants dismissal); Johnson v. Kassovitz, No. 97 Civ. 5789, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15059, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 1998) (requiring plaintiff to file a $50,000 bond for potential costs);
Bressler v. Liebman, No. 96 Civ. 9310 (LAP), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11963, at *26 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14,
1997) (ordering dismissal of plaintiffs action unless, within 5 days, plaintiff files a $50,000 bond as
security for defendants' fees and costs); John A. Gliedman, Access to Federal Courts and Security for
Costs and Fees, 74 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 953. n. 1 (Fall 2000) ("[Federal] courts often entertain motions as
to whether security should be posted for potential costs and attorney fees that may be awarded at the end
of the action."). See also Crocker v. First Hudson Associates, 569 F. Supp. 97, 104 (D.N.J. 1983)
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subject to significant differences in the legal and policy arguments made in support
of their validity, brings with it the same practical result for an indigent potential
litigant whose ability to pursue a cause is dependent on satisfaction of a debt. The
relationship between the imposition of court costs and indigent access is hardly
news; Reginald Heber Smith concluded in 1919 that the financial costs of bringing
and prosecuting a civil action "work[ed] daily to close the doors of the courts to the
poor."46 The scope of an indigent's right to access appellate courts in particular has
been the subject of much more recent litigation, guided in large part by the
47
Supreme Court's decision in M.L.B. v.S.L.J.
MLB. affirmed the right of an indigent parent in a termination action to be
free from the imposition of a substantial fee for trial transcripts. 4 While courts and
commentators have argued over the scope of the Court's ruling, 49 its only certain
application is to indigent parents whose rights have been terminated in a child
protection proceeding initiated by the state. Other parents in private termination
actions not covered even by the limited constitutional protections of Lassiter
remain subject to the kinds of fees struck down in M.L.B. A potential litigant who
lacks the resources to pay a $500 bill is just as effectively barred from court,
regardless of whether that charge is intended to cover the cost of an expert or
transcript, rather than an attorney.

(holding that permission to proceed under federal informa pauperisstatute does not relieve plaintiff of
the obligation to bond for damages).
45. See, e.g., People v. Nicholls, 359 N.E.2d 1095, 1104 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1977) (stating practice of
assessing costs and fees against indigent criminal defendants seeking civil post-conviction relief not
unconstitutional). Inthe federal system, the pauper's statute authorizes a judgment to be rendered for
costs at the conclusion of an unsuccessful action brought by a litigant who has been permitted to sue in
forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (2000). See, e.g., Moore v. McDonald, 30 F.3d 616, 621 (5th Cir.
1994) (noting district court properly ordered indigent plaintiff to pay court costs upon dismissal of
complaint as frivolous); Weaver v. Toombs, 948 F.2d 1004, 1008 (6th Cir. 1991) (explaining section
1915(e) allows both district and circuit courts to enter judgments for costs against indigents bringing
unsuccessful actions).
46. SMrrH, supra note 1, at 28. Smith traces the historical development of court-imposed costs,
which were unknown under English common law and developed entirely as creatures of statute. Id. at
20-22.
47. 519 U.S. 102 (1996).
48. Id. at 129.
49. See, e.g., In re J.M.C.H., No. M2002-0.1097, 2002 WL 31662347, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov.
26, 2002) (reversing termination order entered without supporting record or transcript); In re Joshua M.,
78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 110 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (declining to extend M.L.B. to require payment for
reunification services); Lloyd C. Anderson, The ConstitutionalRight of PoorPeople to Appeal Without
Payment of Fees: Convergence of Due Process and Equal Protection in M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 32 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 441 (1999) (stating that the M.L.B. decision could have sweeping effects but suggesting
M.LB. may not be viable precedent); J.T. Price, An Improper Extension of Civil Litigation by Indigents:
M.L.B v. S.L.J., 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 905 (1996) (criticizing M.L.B. because the decision has no
basis in the Constitution and fails to promote a test to determine when a litigant is entitled to free
appeals); Jason T. Jacoby, Note, M.L.B. v. S.L.J.: "Equal Justice"forIndigent Parents,32 U. RICH. L.
REV. 571 (1998) (discussing how holding in M.LB. has far reaching implications including greater
demands on state resources); Kathleen Prieto, Note, M.L.B. v. S.L.J.: Constitutional Guarantees of
Equal Justice for the Poor in Proceedings to Terminate Parental Rights, 3 LoY. POVERTY L.J. 183
(1997) (examining the problems with the Court's holding in M.LB. but noting that the Court came close
to achieving equal justice for indigent parents).
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11. THE NEED FOR A "CIVIL GIDEON"
Many of the indigent parents who face termination of their rights, to borrow
the often cited words of Justice Black, are "haled into court" 50 to defend
themselves, against charges brought either by the state or by individuals seeking to
adopt their children against their will. However, the reality of adoption includes as
well a world of gray market practices that operate under the radar of both the courts
and child welfare agencies responsible for regulatory oversight. Almost thirty
years ago, Richard Posner and Elisabeth Landes imagined a free market in which
babies could be bought and sold unfettered by oppressive government regulation,
resulting hypothetically in a reduction in the production of less "desirable" children
and a concomitant increase in permanence for children deemed easier to place by
market forces.5 Posner's utopia seems distant indeed from the lucrative and
loosely regulated world of private adoptions, where financial incentives to cut
comers of ethics and law abound. Stories are told of adoption agencies in Chicago
and elsewhere that prey upon populations of financially and emotionally vulnerable
women, in particular Caucasian immigrant communities capable of feeding a
lucrative market for healthy white babies. Recurring predatory practices designed
to free such infants for adoption include threats, 2 false or unenforceable
promises, 3 and the provision of financial or other incentives that border on the
illegal purchasing of children, such as "loan agreements" that are forgiven once an
54
adoption is finalized.

50. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344 ("[Rleason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary
system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be
assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.").
51. Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL
STuD. 323, 334-39 (1978). Posner refined his theory in several subsequent publications, most notably in
a 1987 article. Richard A. Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, 67 B. U. L. REv. 59, 64
(1987) (analogizing "(flor heuristic purposes (only!) ... the sale of babies to the sale of an ordinary
good, such as an automobile or a television set"). Posner's market theory has been roundly criticized.
See e.g., Tamar Frankel & Francis H. Miller, The Inapplicabilityof Market Theory to Adoptions, 67
B.U. L. REv. 99, 99-101 (1987) (discussing how infants, unlike adults, have no control over their actions
and therefore government and society should regulate adoption); Patricia J. Williams, Spare Parts,
Family Values, Old Children, Cheap, 28 NEw ENG. L. REv. 913, 914-15 (1994) (stating Posner's
economic theory is flawed because it would allow agencies to manipulate prices of first-rate and secondrate babies).
52. Two recent cases brought to the attention of the Loyola ChildLaw Clinic involved adoption
agencies that called, or threatened to call child protective services, to have older siblings removed if
birth parents refused to surrender their infant children for adoption.
53. Adoption agencies in Illinois routinely promise birth parents continuing contact with their
children post-adoption, suggesting through phone book ads and promotional materials that aspects of the
adoption will be "open." Less scrupulous agencies routinely fail to disclose that such promises are
absolutely unenforceable under Illinois law. See In re M.M., 619 N.E.2d 702, 711-12 (1il. 1993) (noting
that the Illinois Adoption Act precludes the enforcement of any conditions attached to the surrender of
parental rights).
54. Illinois, like most states, permits the payment of "reasonable living expenses" to a parent
contemplating the surrender of a child for adoption, but otherwise prohibits the buying and selling of
children. Illinois Adoption Compensation Prohibition Act, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 52514.1(a) et seq.
(2002); see also NEv. REv. STAT. § 127.287(1) (2004) (prohibiting payment to or acceptance by natural
parent of compensation in return for placement for or consent to adoption of child); S.C. CODE ANN. §
16-3-1060 (2003) (codifying the same prohibitions as Nevada).
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Women who fall victim to such predatory practices, for various reasons, may
have little incentive to report abuses or violations of law. Disincentives to
disclosure may include shame, fear of reprisals, or lack of support from family.
But even for those birth parents who do seek to raise questions about abusive
adoption practices, obstacles to gaining access to the courts may be virtually
insurmountable. Recently, the Loyola ChildLaw Clinic represented a woman who
fell victim to a particularly unscrupulous adoption agency. The client was a poor,
non-English speaking immigrant mother from Poland, who gave birth to her fourth
child in September 2003. Her financial and emotional circumstances were dire;
though still married, she had been abandoned in turn by both her husband and her
newborn child's father, leaving her to face the prospect of supporting four young
children on the income from several part-time, menial, low-wage jobs.
Out of concern for her ability to provide for her newborn baby, the mother, on
the day of his birth, contacted an adoption agency about the possibility of placing
the child up for adoption. The caseworker who responded to the call met with the
mother twice over three days, accompanied during the second meeting by her
agency's executive director. During both meetings, the agency representatives
dispensed with any approximation of adoption best practices; offering the mother
neither arm's length counseling, nor even the most basic assistance of a proper
translator. More significantly, as inducements to the mother to give up her child
for adoption, they made and repeated promises about continuing post-adoption
contacts that, as noted above, were utterly unenforceable. 5 In reliance on these
hollow promises, the mother signed an irrevocable surrender of her parental rights
some seventy-four hours after the child's birth.5 6 For its limited efforts, 57the agency
received a staggering fee of $50,000 from the family receiving the child.
In Illinois, a surrender to adoption may be set aside upon proof of either fraud
or duress. 8 However, the governing statute provides no free counsel to parents,

55. See In re M.M., 619 N.E.2d at 711-12 (recounting how adoption agencies in Illinois promise
birth parents contact with their child after adoption, which is unenforceable under Illinois law). Illinois
does not allow for the enforcement of post-adoption contacts, however, some states do recognize postadoption contacts. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-35 (LexisNexis 2004) (allowing for contact
between parents of adopted child and petitioner or relatives of adoptee if agreed upon or in adoption
decree); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.305(2) (2004) (dictating that nothing in adoption laws of Oregon shall
prevent birth parents and adoptive parents from entering into written agreement providing for contact
with adoptee and birth parents); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.33.295(1) (West 2004) (mandating that
nothing in Washington Code will be construed to prohibit parties to an adoption proceeding from
entering into agreements regarding adoptee contact with adoptive parents or birth parents).
56. Under Illinois law, surrenders to adoption may not be signed until seventy-two hours after the
child's birth. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/9(A) (2002).

57. This exorbitant charge is permitted under Illinois law, which requires adoption agencies to
account for their fees but neither limits what an agency can require an adopting family to pay in return
for the placement of a child, nor sets standards defining what constitutes a reasonable fee. 750 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 50/14(A) (2002). In contrast, the Department of Health and Human Services' National
Adoption Information Clearinghouse reports that the most expensive categories of domestic adoptions
typically cost adopting parents a maximum of $40,000. See NAT'L ADOPTION INFO. CLEARINGHOUSE,
COSTS

OF

ADOPTING:

A

FACTSHEET FOR

FAMILIES

I

(June

2004),

available at http://

naic.acfhhs.gov/pubs/s cost/s_costs.pdf (providing information about the potential costs of adoption
through several sources).
58. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/11(a) (2002 & Supp. 2004).
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unless they are alleged to be unfit based on a charge of mental impairment, illness,
or retardation. 59 Had this mother been charged by the state in a petition to
terminate her parental rights, she would unquestionably have been entitled to
counsel under state statute. 60 As a petitioner claiming that her rights were violated
in the procurement of her surrender to adoption, she had no entitlement to free legal
assistance, despite the fact that her relationship with her child was no less in
jeopardy than if she had been named as a respondent in a petition charging her as
an unfit parent.
This mother was fortunate to secure volunteer legal counsel able to assist her
61
in bringing a claim against the adoption agency seeking the recovery of her child,
her situation nevertheless went rapidly from bad to worse. Her petition to vacate
the surrender - brought two weeks after the birth of the child - charged the
adoption agency with fraud in the circumstances surrounding the procurement of
her surrender. 62 At the outset of the case, the trial judge proposed the appointment
of a guardian ad litem (GAL) to safeguard the "best interest" of the child.
Attorneys for both the mother and the adoption agency objected to the appointment
as premature, arguing that the claim of fraud framed a dispute in which the mother
and the adoption agency were the only interested, and that the so-called "best
interest" of the child would only become an issue if the charge of fraud was
resolved in the mother's favor and her claim for custody thereby became ripe for
review. The court nevertheless appointed a GAL over objection, with no comment
as to either the statutory authority for the appointment 63 or how the GAL would be
paid.
At the conclusion of an expedited two-day hearing, the trial court denied the
mother's claim of fraud and dismissed her petition. Subsequently, although she
had participated only passively in the trial court proceedings, at the conclusion of
the case the court-appointed GAL submitted a petition for an award of attorney's
fees in the amount of $3300. Without any regard for the relative circumstances of
the parties, the trial judge apportioned the bill evenly between a profitable taxpaying adoption agency that had just been paid $10,000 over the highest going rate
for private adoptions for a few short hours of work, and an indigent single mother

59. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/13(B)(c) (2002).
60. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1-5 (2002).

61. Early in 2004, the Loyola ChildLaw Clinic assisted private volunteer counsel in a similar case,
involving a challenge to an irrevocable surrender to adoption based on both fraud and duress. Counsel
successfully sought to be appointed by the trial court under K.L.P., based on the pendency of a child
protection action initiated at the direction of the judge presiding over the petition to vacate the surrender.

See K.L.P., 763 N.E.2d at 748-50 (holding that equal protection demands provision of assistance of
counsel where significant state action results in permanently removing custody or guardianship of a
parent). This circumstance, like that in K.LP., was highly unusual; the author is aware of no other
situation in which a court has afforded appointed counsel to an indigent petitioner bringing an
independent action to vacate a surrender to adoption.
62. Contingent upon successful prosecution of this claim, the mother also sought a writ of habeas
corpus to recover custody of her child, who had been placed by the agency in a pre-adoptive foster
home.
63. The Illinois Adoption Act mandates the appointment of a guardian ad litem in actions where a
child is sought to be adopted, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50113(B)(a) (2002), but makes no mention of a
broader authority to appoint a GAL in situations encompassing challenges to the legitimacy of a
surrender.
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with three young children. 4 The trial court thus entered a judgment against the
birth mother for $1650, imposing what amounted to a trial tax for her unsuccessful
effort to vindicate her rights as a birth parent. 65
The judgment order against the mother in this case was, to say the least,
jarring. Admittedly, she was not precluded outright from accessing the courts to
bring a complicated legal claim.66 Nevertheless, she was wholly dependent on
volunteer legal counsel. Moreover, at the conclusion of the hearing, she was
subjected to a substantial financial penalty well beyond her means, imposed on her
for seeking to vindicate her fundamental rights through the judicial process. The
penalty was particularly disturbing in light of the considerable doubt over whether
the appointment of a GAL had served any meaningful purpose.
The threat of being taxed with such significant costs, notwithstanding the
client's inability to pay, presents disturbing implications about the fundamental
ability of civil courts to provide a forum responsive to the needs of poor people.
Commentators have acknowledged that even though post-adjudication taxation
orders may not have the same preclusive effect on access to judicial remedies as
front-end litigation access fees, they nevertheless stand as a powerful deterrent to a
litigant seeking to vindicate legitimate, though uncertain rights. 67 Even for the
judgment-proof indigent client, against whom such costs cannot be collected, both
the threat of wage garnishment and the prospect of negative credit reports are
significant considerations in any calculation about whether to risk the incursion of
any litigation costs. 68 As one commentator noted, a rule hinging the taxation of
costs on the litigant's degree of success turns judicial recourse into a "high stakes
economic gamble for the indigent litigant. ' 69 For clients aware that they will be
obliged to pay post-judgment litigation costs without regard to the outcome of the
case, the deterrent effect is even greater. It is virtually inconceivable that the
mother discussed above would have been able to proceed with her case had she
been confronted in advance with the prospect of a $1650 fee.
Nor is it particularly satisfying to deem this penalty proper simply because the
mother stood in the posture of a petitioner rather than a respondent. Much of the
commentary questioning the ongoing legitimacy of Lassiter has suggested
extending the right to counsel only to civil litigants who are haled into court
64. See the Illinois law and HHS report referenced in note 57, supra.
65. On appeal, the birth mother's counsel alleged that the taxation of the GAL's fees and costs
against her amounted to a violation of both equal protection and due process of law, as well as a
violation of public policy. The GAL ultimately agreed to settle her claim for a nominal payment.
66. Indigent litigants in Illinois, as in many states, are eligible for the waiver of fees and costs upon
the filing of a pauper's petition in the trial court. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-105 (2002). Appellate rules
require the payment of a $25 filing fee for civil appellants unless excused by law, though in practice the
appellate courts routinely consider motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. For indigent clients
in civil cases represented by civil legal services providers, the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure also
allows for the waiver of all fees and costs relating to filing, appearing, transcripts on appeal, and service
of process, upon the submission of certification of a determination of indigence by the client's lawyer.
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-105.5 (2002).
67. See, e.g., David Medine, The Constitutional Right to Expert Assistance for Indigents in Civil
Cases, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 281, 293 (1990) (considering adverse effects of post-judgment taxation of
costs on indigent clients).

68. Id. at 293 n.56.
69. Id. at 293.
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unwillingly as respondents?10 Indeed, the majority opinion in Lassiter lends support
for this view by opening the door to the consideration of individual circumstances
that may have little to do with the nature of the interests at stake. 7 However, to the
extent that the Supreme Court's jurisprudence regulating the imposition of barriers
to judicial access truly turns on the nature of the interests involved, it seems to
make little conceptual sense to mete out procedural protections based solely on the
positioning of the parties. Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion in Lassiterpoints
out that prior to that decision, the Court's tradition in applying the Mathews test
had been to conduct case-by-case consideration of different decision-making
contexts, not of different litigants' circumstances within a given context.72 What
ought to weigh in the Mathews calculus, according to Justice Blackmun, are not the
particular facts of each case, but rather the nature of the generic interests shared by
all parents threatened with termination of parental rights, and by the state in all
cases where a parent's conduct implicates the state's role as parens patria. 3
Similarly, Justice Harlan's opinion in Boddie v. Connecticut urges that "persons
forced to settle their claims of right and duty through the judicial process must be
given a meaningful opportunity to be heard, ' 74 without regard to the accidents of
procedural posture. Indeed, especially in the family law arena, procedural posture
may well be nothing more than an unhappy chance of circumstance, reflecting only
75
the results of the race to court between competing litigants.
Much more significant are the concerns about the extent to which the state
exercises exclusive control over the mechanism by which a party's rights may be
adjusted or circumscribed, and the fundamental nature of the interests involved.
The court in K.L.P. considered and rejected the argument that a finding of state
action can be based on the mere fact that a state court must necessarily provide a
forum for the dispute. 76 However, this conclusion seems implicitly to have more to
do with financial and practical concerns about extending the right to counsel than
with defensible logic. Professor Frank I. Michelman argues persuasively against
reliance on procedural posture as a basis for regulating waiver of access fees,

70. E.g., Simran Bindra & Pedram Ben-Cohen, Public Civil Defenders: A Right to Counsel For
Indigent Civil Defendants, 10 GEo. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 1, 2 (2003) (arguing for special

protection of indigent civil defendants, who unlike indigent civil plaintiffs lack even the prospect of a
contingent recovery).
71. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 32-33 (taking into account circumstances regarding the mother's
behavior, and finding them to outweigh any parental interest in her child).
dissenting).
72. Id.at 49 (Blackmun, J.,
73. See id. (reminding the Court that generic interests are the appropriate focus of a Mathews
inquiry).
74. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971). The Boddie Court ultimately held that states
cannot forestall the right to adjust "a fundamental human relationship," without affording indigent
litigants "access to the means it has proscribed for doing so." Id. at 383.
75. Even outside the family law arena, the procedural posture in which a litigant stands may reflect
little about the nature of the interests sought to be vindicated. Professor Michelman begins his
exploration of the theoretical underpinnings of the Court's decisions on litigation access fees with two
posited hypotheticals, both involving a party's efforts to seek recourse for a finance company's wrongful
possession of a vehicle. Michelman, supra note 43, at 1154-55. The distinctions in his hypotheticals are

substantively inconsequential, but leave one litigant in the posture of a plaintiff, obliged to pay a filing
fee, and one in the posture of a defendant with no such obligation. Id.
76. K.LP., 763 N.E.2d at 751.
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noting with particular respect to divorce disputes that states exercise exclusive
control over the regulation of marital relationships. 77 This observation is every bit
as applicable to the termination of parental rights, where the states' parens patria
interest in regulating parent-child relationships requires even so-called "private"
termination actions to be heard by the courts. 78 Most importantly, the stakes for the
mother in this case were exactly the same as for a parent charged as a respondent
with unfitness: the threatened permanent loss of her relationship with a child.
All of the concerns discussed above may reasonably be traced back to the
refusal of the Supreme Court in Lassiter to recognize the applicability of the same
fundamental constitutional protections as are routinely provided to criminal
defendants. In each and every circumstance in which parents facing the threatened
loss of consortium with their children challenge barriers to meaningful judicial
access, the constitutional analysis of those barriers must now begin with a decision
that fails to recognize indigents' absolute right to the protections of due process,
even when fundamental rights are threatened. In the criminal arena, the Court has
consistently treated the right to free counsel as entrenched, extending the holding of
Gideon to juveniles charged with acts of delinquency,79 misdemeanor proceedings
where actual imprisonment is imposed, 80 and suspended sentences that may lead to
imprisonment. 81 In the civil arena, however, even in the limited circumstances
where a parent's fundamental liberty interest in safeguarding a relationship with a
child is acknowledged, the most that a parent is constitutionally entitled to is the
individualized balancing of factors under Mathews, with no certainty that the
outcome will result in the assistance of counsel. As Douglas Besharov pointedly
observed in the immediate wake of the decision, "Lassiter, for all practical
purposes, stands for the proposition that a drunken driver's night in the cooler is a
greater deprivation of liberty than a parent's permanent loss of rights in a child. '82
The continuing failure of the American legal system to approach the ideals
mapped out by Reginald Heber Smith has been well documented. Studies have
repeatedly explored the inability of the great majority of United States citizens to
access the assistance of counsel to help protect basic rights and needs. 83 California

77. Michelman, supra note 43, at 1198 ("[Tlhe state is the author of both the rules imposing special
restrictions on the freedom of married persons and the rule forbidding self-help retrieval of one's liberty
from the grip of those restrictions ....").

78. See K.LP., 763 N.E.2d at 751 (noting that adoption exists only as a creature of statute, and that
"[p]rospective adoptive parents cannot achieve their goal of parenthood by contract or other private
means; they must involve the court").
79. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 73 (1967).
80. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).
81. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 662 (2002).
82. See Besharov, supranote 3, at 221 (arguing that the Lassiter decision limits the constitutionallyprotected status of the family relationship by denying indigent parents the right to counsel but that courts
continue to mandate counsel for other indigent persons facing jail time, no matter how short).
83. See, e.g., Alan W. Houseman, Civil Legal Assistance for Low-income Persons: Looking Back
and Looking Forward, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1213, 1213-17 (2002) (discussing how recent changes
and restrictions imposed upon legal aid facilities, which are funded by the Legal Services Corporation
Act, contribute to the growing inability of Americans to access legal aid); AM. BAR ASSN., AGENDA FOR
ACCESS: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND CIVIL JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE
COMPREHENSIVE
LEGAL
NEEDS
STUDY, ExEcurIVE
SUMMARY
(1996),
available at
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Appellate Justice Earl Johnson Jr., a frequent critic of barriers limiting indigent
access to the courts, recently compared the United States unfavorably to a long list
of other Western democracies that guarantee counsel for indigents in civil cases,
concluding that Smith's concept of "equal justice" is nothing more than an illusory
ideal.8Y
Building on this uninspiring history, a steady stream of commentators have
issued calls for a "civil Gideon," and for the reversal of the pinched view of due
process applied to fundamental family relations by the narrow majority in
5 Professor Rhode, for example, condemns the case law governing access
Lassiter.8
to the effective assistance of counsel as a "conceptual embarrassment," 86 noting that
"the right to sue and defend is a right 'conservative of all other rights, and lies at
the foundation of orderly government."'' 87 Occasionally, these calls have been
echoed in judicial opinions. Most significant among these, of course, is Justice
Blackmun's dissent in Lassiter itself,88 exploring both the compelling practical
obstacles faced by an indigent parent seeking to defend herself against a
termination action, 9 and the legal illogic of requiring an individualized judgment of
the need for counsel, even after consideration of the Mathews factors compels
acknowledgment of the parent's fundamental protected liberty interests. 90
Similarly, Deborah Frase's hapless efforts to represent herself prompted one
Maryland Appellate Justice - cognizant of the strictures of Lassiter - to argue
eloquently for the interpretation of state constitutional provisions to encompass a
broader right to counsel for indigent parents threatened with intrusions into their
For all their powerful and persuasive rhetoric,
parent-child relationships.91
however, these voices will almost certainly remain in dissent as long as Lassiter
stands as the law of the land.

http:/Iwww.abanet.org/legalservicesldownloadssclaidlagendaforaccess.pdf (reviewing the growing
disconnect between Americans and affordable legal services).
84. Justice Earl Johnson, Jr., Equal Access to Justice: Comparing Access to Justice in the United
States and Other IndustrialDemocracies, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. S83 (2000). See also Earl Johnson,
Jr., Toward Equal Justice: Where the United States Stands Two Decades Later, 5 MD. J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 199 (1994); Earl Johnson, Jr., The Right to Counsel in Civil Cases: An International
Perspective, 19 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 341 (1985); Earl Johnson, Jr. & Elizabeth Schwartz, Beyond Payne:
The Case for a Legally Enforceable Right to Representation in Civil Cases For Indigent California
Litigants Pan One: The Legal Arguments, 11 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 249 (1978).
85. See, e.g., Bindra & Ben-Cohen, supra note 70; Rhode, supra note 3; Robert W. Sweet, Civil
Gideon and Confidence in a Just Society, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 503, 506 (1998); Johnson, Toward
Equal Justice, supra note 84; William L. Dick, Jr., Note, The Right to Appointed Counselfor Indigent
Civil Litigants: The Demands of Due Process, 30 WM. & MARY L. REv. 627 (1989) (analyzing Gideon
and the Court's justifications for the holding); Joan Grace Ritchey, Note, Limits on Justice: The United
States' Failure to Recognize a Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 317, 337-41

(2001) (examining other countries and suggesting that the United States follow in the same pattern to
provide legal counsel for all civil litigants).
86. Rhode, supra note 3, at 1786.
87. Id. at 1799 (citing Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907)).
88. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 35 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

89. Id. at 45-46, 52-56.
90. Id. at 48-49.
91. Frase v. Barnhart, 840 A.2d 114, 134-36 (Md. 2003) (Cathell, J., concurring).
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Notably, Justice Black's landmark opinion in Gideon came twenty-one years
after the low-water mark decision in Betts v. Brady,92 which refused to recognize a
comprehensive right to counsel for indigents charged with felonies in criminal
court. With the added years of perspective, the Court in Gideon took a markedly
different tack, acknowledging that Betts had been a clear break with the Court's
precedents recognizing the fundamental nature of the right to counsel and its
relationship to Fourteenth Amendment protections.93
By this reckoning,
reassessment of Lassiter'streatment of parents' fundamental liberty interest in their
relationships with their children is now at least two years overdue.

92. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
93. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342-43 (1963) (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Grosjean v.
American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936); and Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)).
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